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CHURCH-STATE AND THE ZORACH CASE
We Are a Religious People
"The mere formulation of a relevant Constitutional prin-
ciple is the beginning of the solution of a problem, not its
answer." 1
It is particularly appropriate that Justice Frankfurter enun-
ciated this prophetic proposition in discussing the problem
of the proper relationship of Church and State. During the
last decade, the Supreme Court has decided three important
cases 2 involving the Church-State principle. Each has occas-
ioned sharp dissents by members of the Court; each has
aligned lawyers, educators, religious leaders and the public
generally into contesting factions; each has created a greater
awareness of the significance of the problem and of the
necessity for its ultimate solution.
In 1946, the Court was called on to decide whether a
New Jersey statute providing for free transportation of
parochial, as well as public, school children was constitu-
tional.3 It was argued that the law was unconstitutional, for
it was "an establishment of religion" thus violating the first
clause of the First Amendment.4 This was the first time, in
the one hundred and fifty years of its existence, that the
Supreme Court had occasion to consider the constitutionality
of a state statute in light of the Establishment of Religion
Clause. The statute was upheld, but in the process of deciding
the case, the Court critically examined the meaning of the
pertinent portion of the First Amendment. It concluded that
1 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92
L. Ed. 649 (1948).
2 Zorach v. Clauson, ....U.S., 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952);
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649
(1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711
(1947).
3 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711
(1947).
4 Id. 330 U.S. at 1.
(529)
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the principle of separation of Church and State was inherent
in the First Amendment and that separation meant that:
"Neither a state nor the Federal Government ... can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another." I The dissenting justices concurred
in this conclusion. They differed with the majority in the
matter of its application, the latter holding that the granting
of "aid" could not be construed so narrowly as to cut off
welfare services for children attending parochial schools.6
The significance of Everson was that the first step in the
formulation of a "relevant principle" had been taken. It
obviously was just the "beginning of the solution" of the
problem of the relation of Church and State.
Soon the Court was again confronted with a case involving
separation of Church and State. In Champaign, Illinois, the
school board had adopted a plan of releasing children from
classes during the school day to receive religious instruction,
provided that their parents consented to the release. Relig-
ious instruction was given by representatives of different
sects to the children so released. The instruction was given
on the school premises. Those children who were not released
continued to pursue their academic studies. Although the
Supreme Court of Illinois unanimously upheld this practice,7
the Supreme Court of the United States shortly, thereafter,
decided the Everson case with its broad interpretation of the
First Amendment. The dissenting justices had indicated that
not only transportation of parochial school students, but re-
leased time programs were unconstitutional.' Accordingly,
the McCollum case was appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States.
Appellants relied squarely upon the proposition that the
released time program was an "establishment of religion"
5 Id., 330 U.S. at 15.
6 Id., 330 U.S. at 16.
7 McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E. (2d) 161 (1947).
8 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed.
711 (1947).
THE ZORACH CASE
and thus violated the First Amendment. This case precipi-
tated a more critical analysis of the historicity of the First
Amendment. Research by the attorneys furnished the Court
an impressive number of original documents involving the
legislative history of the First Amendment.9 These docu-
ments, on the whole, demonstrated that our Founding
Fathers simply intended to prevent the extension of a legal
preference when they framed the First Amendment. As a
corollary proposition, the appellees contended that friendly
cooperation of Church and State was not unconstitutional.
Appellees relied upon the rights of the parents, whose chil-
dren were attending released time classes. Attorneys for
appellant, on the other hand, maintained that the Champaign
plan constituted an "aid to all religions" and, hence, was
unconstitutional.
The Court adopted this latter view. It declared that the
interpretation of the First Amendment in Everson was not
dicta, but law, and that it exemplified the principle of separa-
tion of Church and State. With respect to the released time
practice, the Court declared: "0
Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school
buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The
State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that
it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through
use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is
not separation of Church and State.
No reference was made to the rights of the parents, whose
children were attending the released time classes. The pre-
occupation of the Court, with the formulation of what it
considered a relevant principle involving separation of
Church and State, apparently precluded consideration of
the parental prerogative. This occasioned considerable con-
9 Brief of Appellees, McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.
Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
10 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92
L. Ed. 649 (1948).
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cern." Unequivocally, the proposition that impartial aid
might be given to all religions was rejected. The term "aid"
as used in Everson was given a broad interpretation.
This interpretation of the First Amendment was warmly
welcomed by advocates of secularism.2 The Court's favor-
able reference 1' to Jefferson's metaphor of "a wall of separa-
tion between church and State" was widely acclaimed in
secularist circles. On the other hand, the decision was viewed
with alarm by those who felt that the traditional norm of
cooperation was necessary to the preservation of our form
of government. 4 This group felt that a salient had been
11 Drinan, The Novel "Liberty" Created by the McCollum Decision, 39 GEo.
L.J. 216, 225-8, (1951); Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14
LAw & CONTENT. PROD. 73, 74-6 (1949); Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation
Between Church and State, 14 LAw & CONTEa'. PROD. 61, 67-8 (1949); Schmidt,
Religious Liberty and the Supreme Court of the United States, 17 FORD. L. REv.
173, 179 (1948). Forcefully, John Courtney Murray, S.J., observed: "In the
McCollum case there was squarely presented to the Court the issue of parental
rights in education. And the Court greeted the presentation with a blank, unseeing
stare. Yet the issue is woven all through the facts of the case; the whole Cham-
paign plan hung suspended on the right of parents to have effective voice in
regard to what their schools should do for their children, what role in the
community their schools should play. Yet the Court does not betray by so
much as a word any awareness of this outstanding fact of the case. It passes the
issue by on the other side of the street, grimly pounding the sidewalk of its own
absolutism. What is worse, its clear assumptions are that the public school system
belongs singly to the state and is under its sole supervision; that its functions
are determined solely by the state; that the state's compulsory education machinery
grinds away with only the state at the controls; that even the child's time in
school is owned by the government; that the child has a 'legal duty' to put all
this time in on secular subjects, none on religious subjects, apart from the state's
sovereign permission, which (the Court says) the state is constitutionally powerless
to give." Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CONTENT. PROB. 23, 36
(1949).
12 BLAr, CORNERSTONES or RELIGIoUs FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1949); Burrs,
THE AMRICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION 201-8 (1950); MoEHL-
MAN, THE WALL or SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH1 AND STATE 53-7 (1951);
NEwmAN, THE SECTARIAN INVASION OF OUR PUBLIC SCHOO.S (1925); THAYER,
THE ATTACK UPON THE AMERICAN SECULAR SCHOOL 179-99 (1951).
13 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211, 68 S. Ct. 461,
92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
14 O'NEiL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CoNsarru ON 219-53
(1949); PARSONS, THE FmsT FREEDOM 158-78 (1948); VAN DusEN, GoD IN
EDUCATION (1951); Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14
LAw & CONTENT. PROB. 3 (1949); Drinan, supra note 11; Fahy, supra note 11,
at 73; Meiklejohn, supra note 11, at 61; Murray, supra note 11; Sullivan,
Religious Education in the Schools, 14 LAw & CONTENT. PROB. 92 (1949). The
American Bar Association forcefully stated: "The McCollum case may be one
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established which, if expanded, would seriously jeopardize
the private institutional system, the full exercise of the par-
ental right, and the religious genesis of our culture.
Immediately, battle lines were established and advocates
of absolute separation of Church and State, admitting of no
cooperation between these societies, prepared tracts, pamph-
lets and books, designed to buttress the ruling of the Court.
Similarly, those opposed to the decision wrote extensively in
law journals and periodicals in an attempt to create a climate
of public opinion favorable to the proposition that Church
and State should cooperate within well defined limits. Those
upholding this latter view refused to accept the McCollum
decision as the answer to proper relationship of Church and
State. 5
Paradoxically, it was the advocates of absolute separation
who initiated litigation which would require the Court again
to review the problem of harmonizing the Church-State
relationship. Apparently, fully confident that the Court had
answered the problem completely, instead of just "beginning
the solution," actions were brought to apply the McCollum
decision to other released time plans. Success was encoun-
tered in St. Louis.' 6 Thereupon, the New York released time
law was subjected to judicial scrutiny.
of those fateful decisions which is ignored at the time and regretted in the
future. It deserves thorough consideration now. . . . The latent consequences
of the ruling could hardly be over-emphasized. It is a pronouncement by our
Supreme Court on a fundamental principle, not only of national policy but of
our civilization and way of life....
The traditionally religious sanctions of our law, life and government, are
challenged by a philosophy and a judicial propensity which deserves the careful
thought and concern of lawyers and people." "No Law But Our Own Pre-
possessions"?, 34 A.B.AJ. 482,483, 485 (1948).
15 THE CmusTAN nr AcTIoN, OUR BisHoPs SnAx 193 (Huber ed. 1951);
Brief for National Council of Churches, Zorach v. Clauson, ....U S....., 72 S. Ct.
679, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
16 Balaza v. Board of Education (Cir. Ct. of St. Louis, Mo., Div. No. 3,
No. 18369), quoted in Burrs, op. cit. supra note 12, at 207-8. In Balaza the
Circuit Court of St. Louis held that a released time plan conducted off of
the school premises was unconstitutional.
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This law, as implemented by regulations of the Commis-
sioner of Education,' 7 provided that, on the consent of the
parents, children might be released one hour a week for the
purpose of receiving religious instructions from representa-
tives of their faith. The instruction was given off of the
school premises, but during the school day. The statute in-
volved authorized "absence for religious observance" 1 and
was an amendment to the compulsory education law.
The New York courts, after subjecting the law to close
examination, held that there was no violation of the state or
federal constitutions.'9 The case was then appealed to the
17 "The Regulations Adopted by the State Commissioner of Education
Pursuant to the 1940 statutory mandate, the State Commissioner of Education
promulgated, on July 4, 1940, the Following Regulations which are set forth
in the petition and are still in force (R. 15-16):
'1. Absence of a pupil from school during school hours for religious
observance and education to be had outside the school building
and grounds will be excused upon request in writing signed by
the parent or guardian of the pupil.
'2. The courses in religious observance and education must be
maintained and operated by or under the coritrol of a duly
constituted religious body or of duly constituted religious bodies.
'3. Pupils must be registered for the courses and a copy of the
registration filed with the local public school authorities.
'4. Reports of attendance of pupils upon such courses shall be filed
with the principal or teacher at the end of each week.
'5. Such absence shall be for not more than one hour each week
at the close of a session at a time to be fixed by the local
school authorities.
'6. In the event that more than one school for religious observance
and education is maintained in any district, the hour for
absence for each pa'rticular school in such district shall be the
same for all such religious schools.'"
Brief for Intervenor, The Greater New York Coordinating Committee on Released
Time of Jews, Protestants and Roman Catholics, p. 11, Zorach v. Clauson,
.... U.S....., 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
18 N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3210-1 (b), which was added as an amendment
to § 3210 in 1940 (N.Y. Laws 1940, c. 305), provides: "Absence for religious
observance and education shall be permitted under rules that the commissioner
shall establish."
19 Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 85 N.Y.S. (2d) 682 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
appeal dismissed, 299 N.Y. 564, 85 N.E. (2d) 791 (1949); Zorach v. Clauson,
303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d) 463 (1951). The New York Court of Appeals in
the Zorach case stated, 100 N.E. (2d) at 468: "While extreme care must, of
course, be exercised to protect the constitutional rights of these appellants, it
must also be remembered that the First Amendment not only forbids laws
'respecting an establishment of religion' but also laws 'prohibiting the free
exercise thereof'. We must not destroy one in an effort to preserve the other.
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Supreme Court of the United States, which assumed juris-
diction of the action.
20
The written and oral arguments of the appellants reflected
the view that the First Amendment had erected an absolute
wall of separation which eliminated anything approaching
close cooperation of Church and State, even in an area of
mutual interest. Reliance was placed exclusively on the
McCollum decision. -The proposition was advanced that the
essence of the McCollum decision was the utilization of the
compulsory education machinery of the state, and that this
factor was just as important, functionally, in the New York
law as in the Champaign plan. The position had a surface
validity, but failed to reckon with the fact that the problem
of the relationship of Church and State had not been finally
settled in McCollum.
Appellees distinguished the New York system and the
Champaign plan by pointing out that in the former religious
instruction was not given in the school room. The significance
of this position was not confined to the proposition that no
tax supported property was being used for religious instruc-
tion; but, rather, that "the momentum of the whole school
atmosphere" 21 was not placed behind the religious instruc-
tion program. A second, and highly pertinent argument, was
that the New York law did no more than recognize the right
of parents to determine, within reasonable bounds, the edu-
cational content of public education. It was asserted that
the freedom of conscience and religious convictions of the
parents were at stake.22 Strong reliance was placed upon the
famous Oregon School case, Pierce v. Society of Sisters.23
We cannot, therefore, be unmindful of the constitutional rights of those many
parents in our State (we are told that some 200,000 children are enrolled in
the released time programs in this jurisdiction, and ten times as many through-
out the nation) who participate in and subscribe to such programs."
20 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2) (Supp. 1951).
21 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 230, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92
L. Ed. 649 (1948).
22 Counsel for Intervenor stated this proposition in the following manner:
"Millions of parents throughout this country believe with deepest conviction that
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The Court, after considering the case for several months,
upheld the constitutionality of the New York law in a six
to three decision. Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion
for the majority, rejected the compulsory education law ar-
gument. He stated: 24
No one is forced to go to the religious classroom .... A
student need not take religious instruction. He is left to his
own desires as to the manner or time of his religious devotions,
if any.
There is a suggestion that the system involves the use of
coercion to get public school students into religious classrooms.
... The present record indeed tells us that the school authori-
ties are neutral in this regard and do no more than release
students whose parents so request.
The Court recognized the fact that the school and the
state cooperate with the religious instruction program. This
the momentum of secularism is a basic cause of the world's ills, and that it
undermines the very cornerstone of our freedom as expressed in these constitu-
tional Preambles and in the Declaration of Independence. Those millions of
parents have a constitutional right so to believe, and to demand reasonable
freedom and respect for that belief in and amid the education of their children.
"Can other parents or other groups now use these same constitutional
guaranties to impose upon everyone, including the State itself, their own
theories as to the contents and implications of the education of other people's
children? Can they force upon other parents the task of endeavoring to undo
after the child's 'business hours' the implications which those other parents
fear?" Brief for Intervenor, supra note 17, at p. 22, Zorach v. Clauson,
.... U.S , 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
23 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925). Referring to the
basic position of the Intervenor, Counsel stated: "They believe that the very
essence of constitutional liberty in this country was unanimously expressed by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, in the following historic and profoundly American statement, the
truth and wisdom of which have been increasingly solemnized by the tragic
human history of the years since its utterance (pp. 534-5):
'Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control. . . . The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stand-
ardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.' (Underscoring ours.) We submit
that the time is ripe for reaffirmance of the basic principles thus enunciated."
Brief for Intervenor, supra note 17, at p. 4.
24 Zorach v. Clauson, .U.S....., 72 S. Ct. 679, 682, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
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is one of the most significant implications of the decision,
for it differs from the suggestion, latent in the McCollum
case, that this type of cooperation of Church and State is
unconstitutional. Justice Black, writing for the majority in
McCollum, referred to the "close cooperation" between the
school authorities and the religious council in-promoting re-
ligious instruction, as one of the unconstitutional elements.25
. Any analysis of the decision indicates that the approval of
cooperation between the state and religious authorities stems
from a shift in the basic philosophy underlying the approach
to the Church-State relationship. The shift is from neutrality
between religion and irreligion to the recognition of the fact
that: 26
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. . . . When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting
the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions.
This is not the first time that the Supreme Court has es-
poused this philosophy; 27 however, it is a timely reaffirma-
tion, for the preservation of our form of democracy demands
cooperation of Church and State. It is the seed bed of our
culture." The truth of this proposition was clearly recognized
25 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 209-10, 68 S. Ct. 461,
92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
26 Zorach v. Clauson, ....U.S., 72 S. Ct. 679, 684, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
27 Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S. Ct.
511, 514, 36 L. Ed. 226 (1892); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625,
51 S. Ct. 570, 75 L. Ed. 1302 (1931); Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 3 L. Ed.
650 (U.S. 1815).
28 In the words of Thomas Jefferson: "Can the liberties of a nation be
thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the
minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God." PADOVER, THE
CoTLT JE=EsON 677 (1943). Walter Lippman has reached that conclusion:
"What separates us from the totalitarian regime is our belief that man does not
belong to the state. . . . They said that man belonged to his Creator, and that
since he was, therefore, an immortal soul, he possesssed inalienable rights as a
person which no power on earth had the right to violate. . . . The liberties
we talk about defending today were established by men who took their con-
ception of man from the great central religious tradition of Western civilization,
and the liberties we inherit can almost certainly not survive the abandonment
of that tradition." Lippman, The Forgotten Foundation, New York Herald
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at the time the First Amendment was adopted. So Justice
Story, commenting on the First Amendment observed: 29
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution,
and of the amendment to it, now under consideration, the
general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that
Christianity ought to receive the encouragement from the
state, so far as it is not incompatible with the private rights
of conscience, and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt
to level all religions, and make it a matter of state policy to
hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal
disapprobation, if not universal indignation.
A similar observation was made in an article in the Sep-
tember, 1789, issue of the widely read magazine, "American
Museum," which was devoted to a discussion of the proposed
amendments to the Constitution."
These are but a few of the statements which could be
adduced to demonstrate the proposition that, at the time of
the framing and adoption of the First Amendment, the people
had a keen appreciation of the necessity for cooperation be-
tween Church and State. They fully realized that coopera-
tion and mutual assistance were the best bulwark against a
union of Church and State, for, otherwise, competition be-
tween the two entities would naturally arise." This compe-
tition would ultimately reduce either Church or State to a
condition of subjection. This had been the invariable history
of Church-State relations. England was a perfect example.
When the Crown refused to recognize the authority of the
Church with respect to marriage, competition immediately
ensued, with the result that the Church became a department
Tribune, Dec. 17, 1938, p. 15, col. 1, 2. See also 3 STOKES, C HURCH AM> STATE
IN THE UNITED STATES 706 (1950).
29 STORY, COmmENTARiEs ON TH= CONSTiTuOON OF THE UmEnm STATES 700
(Abr. 1833).
30 "Schools ought to be formed with the gradual settlement of this country,
and provided with sensible teachers, who shall instruct their pupils in those
capital principles of religion, which are generally received, such as the . . .
attributes of God, his rewards and judgments, a future state, etc." [Emphasis
supplied.] Collin, Remarks on the amendments to the federal constitution
in 6 THE AmERICAN MusEum 235, 236 (1789).
31 PARsoNs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 92-3.
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or agency of the State. It was fully realized that cooperation
was the via media between union and a devitalizing separa-
tion of Church and State, erroneously termed "neutrality." 32
Actually, Church and State are natural partners.
Fortunately, neither the states nor the Federal Govern-
ment adopted an attitude of indifference to religion. Chap-
lains were assigned to the armed forces and the Congress,
and were paid from public funds; the properties of religious
institutions were granted tax exemption; lands were granted
to missions; religious schools were retained for the instruc-
tion of Indian tribes; the use of public buildings was extended
to religious organizations; and provision was made for ac-
quainting school children with the basic concepts of religion.
Many more examples could be set forth, but these are
sufficient to indicate that for 160 years Church and State
have been following a policy of cooperation with no ill
effects to either. Each is independent in its own sphere, each
is in a healthy condition.
It should be noted that all of these examples had a shadow
of unconstitutionality cast over them by McCollum, the juri-
dical philosophy of which was summed up in the concurring
opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the following manner: 34
We renew our conviction that "we have staked the very
existence of our country on the faith that complete separation
between the state and religion is best for the state and best
32 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed.
711 (1947).
33 Pope Leo XIII, The Christian Constitution of States in THE GREAT
ENCYcLicAL LETTms OF POPE LEo XIII 107, 114 (1903). Commenting on this
encyclical, Father Parsons observes: "But Leo continues. This distinction be-
tween church and state, by the very nature of the two, requires co-operation
as well, since 'each of these two powers has authority over the same subjects.'
They must, therefore, co-operate; otherwise, 'two powers would be commanding
contrary things, and it would be a dereliction of duty to disobey either of the
two,' for both state and church come from God, though in different ways.
How they co-operate will necessarily be left to circumstances, which will decide
whether the co-operation be close and immediate or remote and indirect. The
important thing that Leo was thinking of is the conscience of the individual."
PAnsoxs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 91-2.
34 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 232, 68 S. Ct. 461,
92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
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for religion." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 59.
If nowhere else, in the relation between Church and State,
"good fences make good neighbors."
Therefore, it became apparent that the repudiation of this
philosophy is the most significant element of the Court's
decision in the Zorach action. It emphasizes the fact that
there was an important shift in the philosophical approach
to the question. That there was such a shift in the philosophy
of the Church-State relationship is disclosed not only by a
comparison of the McCollum decision with that of Zorach,
but is confirmed by an analysis of the dissent of Justice
Black, who had occasion to write the opinion for the Court in
McCollum. In his Zorach dissent, Justice Black stated: 11
• ..I mean to do more than give routine approval to our
McCollum decision. I mean also to reaffirm my faith in the
fundamental philosophy expressed in McCollum and Everson
v. Board of Education....
Perhaps it may be objected that the Court formally re-
affirmed the McCollum decision and separation of Church
and State. True, but the reaffirmation did not include the
underlying philosophy, hence the juridical effect of McCol-
turn has been altered. Cases must now be decided in the light
of a new emphasis - emphasis on cooperation. This coopera-
tion is naturally limited in its application. It must be exer-
cised in a judicious manner - in a manner designed best to
implement the exercise of freedom of religion. This was done
effectively in the case at bar, for at stake was the exercise
of the religious freedom of parents who wished to have their
children receive religious instruction at such a time that the
child would not be given the impression that it was an
unimportant extra-curricular experience. They knew that
the exclusion of God from the classroom left much more
than an educational vacuum to fill; it created a wall of
resistance to the parental inculcation of religious principles. 6
35 Zorach v. Clauson, ....U S., 72 S. Ct. 679, 686, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
36 The Catholic Bishops of the United States in their statement on secu-
larism, issued November 14, 1947, called attention to this fact in the following
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This philosophy which the Court has embraced is neither
new 37 nor artificial. It is the natural norm of the Church-
State relationship in a nation which has a religious orienta-
tion. After all, such cooperation, in the words of Justice
Douglas, merely "respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs.3 8
It is difficult fully to evaluate the widespread implications
of this new attitude of the Court - an attitude which, while
dormant for a while, is in harmony with the genesis and the
history of this Nation. Concepts of separation of Church and
State, in order to enjoy a constitutional sanction, must hence-
forth be stripped of their secularistic implications. Secular
orthodoxy, which already had been carried to absurd
lengths,39 has been disestablished. In its place, we have a
concept of separation of Church and State which involves
the restriction of each society to its distinct sphere of
activity, with cooperation in areas of mutual interest, such
as education and marriage. Each, for instance, has authority
words: "In the rearing of children and the forming of youth, omission is as
effective as positive statement. A philosophy of education which omits God,
necessarily draws a plan of life in which God either has no place or is a
strictly private concern of men. . . . There would be less danger for the future
of our democratic institutions if secularism were not so deeply intrenched in
much of our thinking on education." THE CHUSrmwAN fN ACTION, OUR BISHOPS
SPEAK, op. cit. supra note 15, at 140.
37 See note 27 supra.
38 Zorach v. Clauson, .... U.S., 72 S. Ct. 679, 684, 96 L Ed. *609 (1952).
39 For instance, in Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. (2d) 711, 198 P. (2d) 17
(1948), which involved the right of a Negro and a white person to marry,
the county attorney predicated his position upon a secularistic concept of
separation of Church and State: "Conformity to this basic principle of separa-
tion of Church and State requires that in determining the constitutional scope
of the state's power to regulate the civil right to marry, no considoation may
be given to the religious aspect of marriage. This being the case, it follows
that the civil right to marry is not and cannot be protected by the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of religion." Brief of the Attorney General of the State
of California, Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. (2d) 711, 198 P. (2d) 17 (1948).
Attention is likewise called to State ex rel. Singelmann v. Morrison, .... La.
57 S. (2d) 238 (1952), where it was argued that the erection of a public
statue of Mother Cabrini on a public square was a violation of separation of
Church and State, Mother Cabrini being a canonized saint of the Roman
Catholic Church.
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over particular aspects of education and marriage, to cite
a few examples. The harmonious exercise of this authority
will inevitably result in the maintenance of religious liberty.
True, the Court not only formally reaffirmed the McCol-
lum decision, but also left its language intact. The language
of the Supreme Court in Everson, and later repeated in Mc-
Collum, to the effect that the state may not "aid" religion,
was not modified. From the moment that this language was
first used, it was asserted that the term "aid" was a "spacious
concept" 40 and that it admitted of varying interpretations.4'
The Supreme Court now has taken the position that the term
"aid" means that Church and State may cooperate to serve
the "spiritual needs" of the people, providing that such co-
operation does not infringe the freedom of others to exercise
their religion. As we have seen, this vital principle is not new,
but rather, is one which has given distinctive character to
democracy as we in the United States know it.42
Interpretation of the term "aid," in such a manner as to
exclude all cooperation between Church and State, though
dominant for a few years, could hardly survive, for it in-
volved a conflict between two portions of both the Everson
40 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 213, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92
L. Ed. 649 (1948).
41 Pfeffer, Religion, Education and the Constitution, 8 LAW. GUILD REV.
387, 391, 399 (1948). In this law review article, Mr. Pfeffer, who was of
Counsel for Plaintiff in the Zorach action, took the following position: ". . the
precise intent of the framers and adopters of the First Amendment, while
interesting, is not decisive. . . . The generation which adopted the Amendment
expressed as a basic principle of American democracy the broad concept of
separation of church and state. The evolution of that concept, did not end in
1791. It is a continuing evolution, and each generation must interpret the
meaning of separation for itself in the light of its conception of American
democracy and the enlightened political thinking of the day. . . The struggle
is a continuing one and the evolution erratic. . . . We are, even today, still
far removed from a complete separation of religion and government, although
the trend to the present time has clearly been in the forward direction."
Separation of Church and State is, according to this rather widely held view,
a creature of the political thinking of the day. This hardly accords with the
classic concept of constitutional principles. Nor does it give us a definitive norm
for solving the many complex Church-State problems. The process is one of
adaptation and application, not of evolution.
42 Corwin, supra note 14, at 20-1.
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and McCollum decisions. The one, which set forth the Court's
definition of separation of Church and State; the other, which
stated that the State may not be the adversary of religion.
The middle ground and the constitutional ground of coopera-
tion is obviously most consistent with religious liberty. The
alternative does not involve "neutrality," but rather, "hos-
tility." The Court clearly realized this when it stated that
the failure to accommodate public service to spiritual needs
"would be preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe .... We cannot read into the Bill of
Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion." " The
above statement is the last and concluding one of the ma-
jority opinion. Significantly, it represents the fact that the
Court was deeply concerned with developing a basic juridical
philosophy of separation of Church and State consistent with
the traditions of this country - the traditions which, trans-
lated into action, have resulted in a widespread enjoyment
of freedom of religion.
A careful reading of the Zorach majority opinion fails to
disclose a reliance on the "wall of separation" theory. Wisely,
the Court has refrained from relying upon a metaphor as a
basis for decision. Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion,
critically remarks that "The wall which the Court was pro-
fessing to erect between Church and State has become even
more warped and twisted than I expected." 4 Actually, the
so-called wall of separation on which McCollum was based,
has searchingly been re-examined by the Court. It now be-
comes less a wall and more a line of orderly demarcation
defining the rights of both government and religion. Quite
obviously, too much reliance has been placed upon a "wall
of separation" metaphor.45 It has been a constant source of
43 Zorach v. Clauson, ....U.S_.., 72 S. Ct. 679, 684-5, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
44 Id., 72 S. Ct. at 689.
45 "It is thus clear beyond cavil that the Constitution does not demand
that every friendly gesture between church and State shall be discountenanced.
The so-called 'wall of separation' may be built so high and so broad as to
impair both State and church, as we have come to know them. Indeed, we
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confusion.46 Long before extensive reliance was placed on the
"wall of separation," Justice Cardozo gave a clear warning
against reliance upon metaphors.47 Now, in the Zorach pro-
nouncement, we have a clarification and a more sensible
definition of the correlative rights of religion and govern-
ment. A norm has been established which will enable the
court more intelligently to appraise questions involving
Church and State.
Another encouraging aspect of Zorach is the refusal by the
Court to consider the wisdom or the expediency of the re-
leased time program, as a basis for constitutional decision.4"
In the McCollum decision, considerable attention was given
to the question of "divisiveness." An analysis of arguments
based upon divisiveness will inevitably disclose that this pro-
position is directed solely to the wisdom of the plan. Regard-
less of this fact, the brief of counsel for plaintiff and his oral
argument before the Supreme Court in Zorach disclosed a
persistent reliance on the alleged element of divisiveness.
Divisiveness and discrimination are entirely different con-
cepts. Discrimination has constitutional significance; divis-
iveness, legislative significance. Regardless of this fact, much
attention is given to the proposition by Justice Frankfurter.
should convert this 'wall', which in our 'religious nation', Church of Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226, is
designed as a reasonable line of demarcation between friends, into an 'iron
curtain' as between foes, were we to strike down this sincere and most scrupu-
lous effort of our State legislators, the elected representatives of the People
to find an accommodation between constitutional prohibitions and the right ol
parental control over children." Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y 161, 100 N.E
(2d) 463, 467-8 (1951).
46 "The wall of separation is a very satisfying metaphor. It has a fine,
tangible, firm sound. No one can doubt where a stone wall is. But a metaphor
is generally more effective as a slogan than usable as a definition. ... ."
Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1306, 1311
(1949).
47 "A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny
of labels." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed.
674 (1934). Unfortunately, much of the re-thinking on the question of separa-
tion of Church and State was characterized by the very practice condemned
by the late Justice Cardozo. The tyranny of the label "wall of separation"
dealt a severe blow to-released time courses of religious instruction and threat-
ened many other traditional American practices.
48 Zorach v. Clauson, ....U.S....., 72 S. Ct. 679, 684, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
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In his Zorach dissenting opinion, he refers to the. case as the
"deeply divisive controversy." " Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion in the McCollum action dealt at length with
the proposition that released time is a divisive practice and,
hence, cannot be sustained.50 It is reasonable to believe that,
in future cases involving the Church-State relationship, this
question will not be considered a proper one for judicial
consideration.
An attempt fully to evaluate a Supreme Court decision
of such widespread implications, as that of Zorach v. Clauson,
within a month after it was handed down would be prema-
ture. Already, many contradictory statements have found
their way into respected publications. Some go so far as to
say that the McCollum decision has been reversed by impli-
cation.5"
In summary, a tentative analysis of the two decisions indi-
cates that the Supreme Court still considers the McCollum
decision as a binding authority. The reliance upon the propo-
sition that Government may not aid religion still persists,
but the interpretation of the term "aid," as we have seen,
is much more narrow than in McCollum. "Aid" must now be
interpreted in light of the proposition, "We are a religious
people." This is the key to the significance of the McCollum
decision. A new norm has been established determining the
judicial content of the constitutionally critical term "aid."
This new norm carries with it the tradition of cooperation
of Church and State, and, implicitly, cooperation of parents
with the State. To put it succinctly, we again may rely upon
a "common sense" 52 approach to the solution of the Church-
State controversy, and in so doing, may be assured that long
established judicial techniques for solving constitutional con-
49 Id., 72 S. Ct. at 688.
50 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 217, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92
L. Ed. 649 (1948).
51 Information Service, National Council of Churches of Christ in the
United States, May 17, 1952, p. 4, col. 1.
52 Zorach v. Clauson ....U.S. 72 S. Ct. 679, 683, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
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troversies will again be relied upon. Uncertainty and con-
fusion are removed from the judicial approach to Church-
State cases. The reaffirmation of the validity of the tradition-
al relationship between Church and State satisfies the neces-
sity for defining clearly the boundaries of the principle of
separation of Church and State, in such a way as to limit its
application in a manner harmonious with the basic traditions
of this country. This much the Court has accomplished, and
admittedly the contribution to the ultimate solution of the
problem of the relations of Church and State has been sub-
stantial. The fact remains, however, that the problem has
not been fully answered. The apparent strength and appeal
of the dissenting opinions attest to this fact.
To turn now to the Church-State question as it applies
to education, it appears that it will not be solved until more
critical attention is given to the nature and effect of the
compulsory education law. The reasoning of the Court in
Everson, McCollum and Zorach points to this necessity.
The Zorack majority opinion merely states there is no
coercion, no violation of the compulsory education law,
without explaining why there was no violation. Coercion is
at the heart of the dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson.
For instance, his dissent begins with the following com-
ment: " "This released time program is founded upon a use
of the State's power of coercion, which, for me, determines
its unconstitutionality." Justice Black and Justice Frank-
furter similarly emphasized the proposition that the com-
pulsory school law was used in such a way as to promote
religious education.
There is indeed considerable confusion involving the con-
stitutional implications of the concept. For example, Justice
Jackson stated, in his concurring opinion in McCollum,
that: "
53 Id., 72 S. Ct. at 689.
54 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 233, 68 S. Ct. 461, 92
L. Ed. 649 (1948).
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Since no legal compulsion is applied to complainant's son
himself and no penalty is imposed or threatened from which
we may relieve him, we can hardly base jurisdiction on this
ground.
Nor is this the only point of confusion involving the ele-
ment of coercion. The dissenting opinions uniformly state
that the compulsory education law immediately affects the
child, rather than the parent.55 Actually, this law is only
operative upon parents.56 The failure to recognize the true
character of the operation of compulsory educational laws
has been the source of much of the confusion and misunder-
standing in Church-State cases in the field of education. The
position of parents, with relation to the compulsory educa-
tional laws, has been completely ignored, with the result that
improper emphasis has been placed upon the nature and
effect of these laws.
57
If it were true that this law relates primarily and directly
to children, then it is exceedingly difficult to harmonize the
position of the dissenting justices in the Zorach action, as
well as the majority opinion in the McCollum case, with the
precedent established in the Oregon School case,5" for the
55 Justice Black, dissenting, remarked: "The state thus makes religious
sects beneficiaries of its power to compel children to attend secular schools."
[Emphasis supplied.] Zorach v. Clauson, ....U S ...., 72 S. Ct. 679, 686, 96
L. Ed. *609 (1952). Similarly, Justice Jackson argued: "Stripped to its
essentials, the plan has two stages, first, that the State compel each student
to yield a large part of his time for public secular education and, second, that
some of it be 'released' to him on condition that he devote it to sectarian
religious purposes." [Emphasis supplied.) Zorach v. Clauson, supra, 72 S. Ct.
at 689.
56 LouGHERY, PARENTAL RirHTs iN AMEIcAN EDucAT oNAL LAW: THEnR
BASEs AND IMLEMxENTATION 66-72 (1952).
57 See note 11 supra.
58 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070
(1925). This conflict between the Oregon School case and the McCollum de-
cision was dearly demonstrated by Father Murray: "This silence on the parental
right is equivalent in the context to positive statement. It implicitly qualifies
the Pierce doctrine; now apparently the child is not a creature of the state -
until he crosses the threshold of a public school. Parents have a right to
direct the education of their children - limited by the exigencies of a 'unifying
secularism' that is a constitutional necessity in public education. The Court's
silence on the parental right argues -that it is not a factor in the case; and
this is particularly damaging at the present moment, when this right is under
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compulsory educational law, to the extent that it is operative,
is not confined solely to public school attendance. The in-
consistency between the Pierce case and the McCollum de-
cision, the thinking of which is embraced in the dissenting
opinions in Zorack, has been extensively noted by constitu-
tional and educational authorities.59 Actually, much of the
difficulty disappears when the concept of compulsory educa-
tion is given its proper orientation, that is, when it is con-
sidered in conjunction with parental rights. The child attends
school, public, private, or parochial, in pursuance of the
exercise of the natural duty of parents to educate their chil-
dren. It is only when parents fail or refuse to fulfill this duty,
that the state's compulsory educational machinery comes into
active operation. In other words, the operation of the com-
pulsory education law is contingent on the failure of parents
to fulfill their natural function of providing an education
for their children. Therefore, it cannot be validly argued that
children attend school solely as a result of the compulsory
education law. This might be true in the case of a child who
had been committed to a state institution and over whom
the state exercised its authority as parens patriae in the pri-
mary sense, but it does not apply to a child who is a member
of a family, and is subject to the jurisdiction of a family.
open or veiled or unconscious attack from highly articulate groups. It tends
to undermine the juridical status of the parental right in American law.
Correlatively, it tends to render exclusive the rights of the state in education.
In a moment of delicate balance it weights the scales, as I said, in favor of
a philosophy of education of decidedly statist flavor. And the parental right
which, as a sheer immunity, is already like the smile on some sort of disem-
bodied educational Cheshire cat, begins to fade under the Court's unseeing
stare." Murray, supra note 11, at 36.
59 Corwin, supra note 14, at 20; Drinan, supra note 11, at 227-8. Professor
Meiklejohn states the problem: "Under the 'released time' plan pupils are
released 'in part' from their legal duty. Under the parochial school plan they
are released altogether. In both cases attendance is 'compelled by law' for
the sake of what Justice Black calls 'the spreading of faith.' Why, then, is the
partial release regarded as an 'establishment of religion' while the total release
for the same purpose is not so regarded? It would seem that if the McCollum
decision stands, the parochial school system, together with all other religious
school systems, must be abolished. And, by direct implication, if the schools
are to remain, the decision must go." Meiklejohn, supra note 11, at 67-8.
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In a democracy such as ours, the rights of the parents are
paramount." Such being the case, it cannot validly be argued
that state power is being used to "aid religion" or to "coerce
children." In the operation of released time programs, the
element of coercion applies only to parents, not to children.
Obviously, if the state's coercive power is not applicable to
children, and if children, as demonstrated, attend school,
whether it be public or non-public, in accordance with the
exercise of the parental duty to educate, then it is erroneous
to argue that there is a violation of separation of Church and
State. As a matter of fact, too much emphasis is placed upon
the term "Church" rather than upon parents. Even the ma-
jority opinion in Zorach had very little to say about the part
which the parents play in the educational process. It is true
that the Court did refer to the fact that the parents must
first give their consent and approval before a child may par-
ticipate in the program. Unfortunately, the Court did not
elaborate on this fundamental proposition, and thereby
missed an excellent opportunity to settle a vexatious problem.
The Court of Appeals of the State of New York, on the
contrary, emphasized the role of parents.6 It would be nat-
ural to-assume that the Court, in light of the strong emphasis
placed upon the parental right in the decision of the New
York Court of Appeals and in the briefs of the state and the
intervenor-respondent, The Greater New York Coordinating
Committee on Released Time, would similarly place more
60 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed.
1070 (1925).
61 Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E. (2d) 463, 468-9 (1951).
Here the court stated: "Moreover, parents have the right to educate their
children elsewhere than in the public schools, provided -the State's minimum
requirements are met, Education Law, § 3204; Pierce v. Society of the Sisters
: . . and thus, if they wish, choose a religious or parochial 9chool where religious
instruction is freely given. That being so, it follows that parents, who desire
to have their children educated in the public schools but to withdraw them
therefrom for the limited period of only one hour a week in order to receive
religious instruction, may ask the public school for such permission, and the
school may constitutionally accede to this parental request. There is nothing in
the Constitution commanding that religious instruction may be given on the
Sabbath alone, and on no other day."
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emphasis on the basic parental right involved in this case.
The Court's opinion rather seems to stem from the propo-
sition that, since "We are a religious people," cooperation
of Church and State is constitutionally acceptable. While,
admittedly, this is a substantial step forward, the cooperation
involved was actually between the state and the parents.
Religious sects were not the primary beneficiaries of the
action of the New York Legislature in enacting the released
time law, but rather the parents and the home.
Unless emphasis is placed upon the paramount right of
the parents, courts will tend towards the proposition that,
during the time covered by the compulsory education law,
the child is the creature of the state rather than the parents.
It was this fact which lead the New York Coordinating Com-
mittee on Released Time to observe in its brief: "Stated
nakedly, the issue in its ultimate reach is between state abso-
lutism in public education and the natural and constitutional
rights of parents." 62 This was not an overstatement of the
issue, as evidenced by Justice Jackson's observation that the
state compelled: 63
• . . each student to yield a large part of his time for public
secular education and second, that some of it be "released"
to him on condition that he devote it to sectarian religious
purposes.
This proposition assumes that the state has an exclusive con-
trol or monopoly over the time of the child during the com-
pulsory educational period. Fortunately, this proposition was
not adopted by the Court. The majority did not, however,
specifically meet and refute this argument, but rather placed
emphasis on the constitutionality of cooperation - coopera-
tion of Church and State, not cooperation between the state
and parents for the benefit of the child. This latter propo-
sition appears only by implication in the opinion of the
Court. Significantly, however, it is not rejected. A decision
62 Brief for Intervenor, supra note 17, at p. 28.
63 Zorach v. Clauson, ....U.S., 72 S. Ct. 679, 689, 96 L. Ed. *609 (1952).
THE ZORACH CASE
in favor of the plaintiffs would have involved a repudiation
of this parental prerogative.
In the words of Professor Corwin, "it seems unlikely
that the Court is out to emancipate children from their
parents!" However, it is time for the Court to take
appropriate action to put the question at rest. The priority
of the rights of parents in the matter of the education of
their children needs reaffirmation, for today there is a
contest between totalitarian and democratic philosophies
of education.65 The principle that "the child is not the
creature of the state" 66 has suffered from the silence of
the Court when the issues called for its application. It is
hoped that the Court will, at its next opportunity, act to
reaffirm this vital principle, just as today it has restored to
judicial favor the proposition that, "We are a religious
people."
George E. Reed*
64 Corwin, supra note 14, at 19.
65 Father Murray states: "There is a clash of basic philosophies of educa-
tion and of democracy. In addition there is a clash of power; for behind the
philosophy of education as the agent of a unifying, democratic secularism
powerful organized forces are aligned - professional educational associations,
for instance, and other groups pursuing ideological interests. And the contention,
I repeat, primarily is not over money but over principle ... " Murray, supra
note 11, at 35.
66 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed.
1070 (1925).
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